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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH 
AND SECOND INJURY FUND 
Case No. 860272-CA 
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the Industrial Commission err as a matter of law 
in allocating permanent partial disability liability to the Second 
Injury Fund (12.5%), Plaintiff Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
(8.5%) and Jordan School District (4%) in proportion to their 
relative contributions to applicants permanent partial impairment 
as found by the medical panel? 
2» Did the Industrial Commission err as a matter of law 
in its allocation of temporary total disability compensation 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND * 






GILBERT R. LAMB, * 
Applicant/Defendant * 





INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH and * 




associated with the recovery period for the surgery which followed 
the last industrial injury on the same basis as it allocated the 
permanent partial disability compensation? 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 20, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order 
awarding Gilbert R. Lamb, the applicant in the above captioned case, 
temporary total compensation, permanent partial impairment benefits 
and medical expenses relating to three separate industrial accidents 
in which the applicant was injured while employed with Jordan School 
District. In his Order, the Administrative Law Judge apportioned 
the permanent partial impairment benefits among the Second Injury 
Fund, the Workers Compensation Fund and the self-insured employer in 
accordance with the percentage allocation made by the medical panel 
with respect to the underlying causes of the permanent partial 
impairment. Similarly, the Administrative Law Judge apportioned the 
controverted medical expenses among the Second Injury Fund, the 
Workers Compensation Fund and the self-insured employer on the same 
basis. Finally, the Administrative Law Judge assigned 
responsibility for the temporary total compensation benefits to the 
self-insured employer alone with no contributions ordered from the 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
NORMAN H BANGERTER.(.OVIR\OR STEPHEN M. HADLEY, CHAIRMAN 
L L NIELSEN, COMMISSIONER 
JOHN FLOREZ, COMMISSIONER 
To: Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Re: Amendment To Brief of Defendant Second Injury Fund 
Case No.: 860272-CA 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, Plaintiff vs. 
Gilbert R. Lamb, Jordon School District 
Industrial Commission of Utah and Second Injury Fund, 
Defendants 
Dear Mr. Shea, 
I am enclosing 9 copies of new page 3 to the brief of Defendant Second 
Injury Fund in the above-entitled action. The computer printout of the final 
brief which was filed with the Court omitted this page and somehow inserted a 
duplicate of another page of that brief. No other pages have been affected 
and the new page 3 may be attached over page 3 of the existing briefs. In 
the alternative, I have enclosed 9 copies of correct pages 3 and 4 in the event 
you wish to replace the former incorrect page in its entirely. 
Respectfully Submitted 
^J^££ / ^-y^/f^^fi^^ 
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S e c o n d I n j u r y Fund 
SECOND INJURY FUND • ERIE V BOORMAN. ADMINISTRATOR • (801)530-6821 
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This same principle of separate allocation of disability 
compensation has been recognized by this Court in the very recent 
Richfield Care Center v. Torqerson case, supra. In_that case, as in„ 
the Calvin David case, there was an earlier 1980 industrial injury 
and a later 1982 industrial injury, each of which was assigned a 
permanent partial physical impairment of 2.5% by the medical panel. 
In addition, the panel allocated a 2.5% permanent partial impairment 
to conditions which pre-existed both of the industrial injuries. 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that each industrial injury must 
be assessed separately and allocation of disability compensation 
made to the separate industrial injuries as between and among the 
employers and carriers of the respective industrial injuries and the 
Second Injury Fund for the pre-existing conditions. Thus, the case 
was remanded to the Industrial Commission to assess liability to the 
employers in each case and to the Second Injury Fund, with respect 
to the pre-existing contribution in the first instance to the 1980 
award and secondly with respect to the pre-existing contribution to 
the 1982 accident. 
Both of the above Utah Supreme Court decisions in essence 
reject the rationale of the Duane Brown and Mountain States Steel 
cases and require separate treatment of the accidents with 
apportionment of liability in each case. Thus, defendant Second 
Injury Fund submits that the Order of the Industrial Commission in 
this case should be affirmed with respect to its allocation of 
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period for the 1985 surgery which followed the last industrial 
injury of December 5, 1984, when the School District was 
self-insured for workers compensation liability. 
On October 23, 1986, the full Commission, in a unanimous 
decision, issued its Order Denying Workers Compensation Fund Motion 
for Review and Granting Jordan School District Motion for Review, 
which Order in effect amended the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge and apportioned all liability among the Second Injury Fund, 
Plaintiff and School District on the same basis as was allocated by 
the medical panel, i.e. Second Injury Fund 12.5/25 or 50%, Plaintiff 
8.5/25 or 34%, and School District 4/25 or 16%. 
On November 19, 1986, Plaintiff filed this action in the 
Utah Supreme Court as Case no. 860590. The Case was subsequently 
assigned to this Court for determination. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The critical facts in this controversy are either not in 
dispute or so well established by the record as to be beyond 
reasonable controversy. They are as follows: 
1. In 1960, the applicant Gilbert R. Lamb first 
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injured his back in an industrial accident in California. 
After brief medical treatment he had no further problems 
with his back until November 18, 1980 (R210). This 1960 
back injury provided the basis for the allocation by the 
medical panel of 12.5% permanent partial impairment due to 
pre-existing conditions. 
2. On August 10. 1982, the applicant, while working 
for the School District, sustained an on-the-job injury to 
his low back which was acknowledged by plaintiff, as 
compensation carrier for the employer, who paid medical 
bills and temporary total disability compensation. This 
injury was found by the medical panel to be ". 
foremost in causing his ongoing symptoms . . . ." and was 
accorded a 4.5% contribution to applicant's ultimate 
permanent partial impairment by the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
3. On June 24, 1984, applicant again injured his low 
back while still in the employ of the School District (with 
plaintiff still the compensation carrier) (R108-109). This 
injury was accorded a 4% permanent partial impairment by 
the Administrative Law Judge after reference to the Medical 
Panel Report. 
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4. On December 5, 1984, applicant in the course of 
his employment slipped on ice covering at the parking lot 
and once again injured his back (R114-115). This injury 
eventually resulted in low back surgery on applicant on 
March 14, 1985 (R211,124) and was charged by the 
Administrative Law Judge with a 4% permanent partial 
impairment contribution to applicant's overall impairment, 
an evaluation which was consistent with the Medical Panel 
allocation of applicant's impairment between and among the 
various back injuries. 
5. The Medical Panel Report in the case found that 
applicant's ultimate surgery of March 14, 1985, was 
necessitated by conditions existing prior to 1980 combined 
with the overall effects of the accidents of August 10, 
1982, June 14, 1984, and December 5, 1984. The panel 
further found applicant had a permanent partial impairment 
of 12.5% of the whole person from conditions existing prior 
to 1980 (pre-existing). In addition, the panel concluded 
that the combined effects of the accidents in 1982 and 1984 
while applicant was working for the School District had 
caused him to sustain an additional 12.5% permanent 
impairment to the whole person (R199-204). On the basis of 
this report, the Administrative Law Judge made his findings 
and Order allocating permanent partial disability as 
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follows: (1) 12.5% (pre-existing) to the Second Injury 
Fund, and (2) a 12.5% combined percentage to the other 
three School District injuries. However. the 
Administrative Law Judge assessed liability for all 
temporary total disability to the School District. The 
Administrative Law Judge further assessed plaintiff with 
all of the medical expenses in the first instance with 
reimbursement from the Second injury Fund for 50% and from 
the School District for 16%. 
6. Motions for Review were filed by plaintiff Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah and the School District. 
Plaintiff contended that it had no liability for permanent 
partial impairment, or temporary total disability, 
contending that the rationale of Mountain States Steel and 
Duane Brown Chevrolet cases prohibited apportionment among 
carriers. The School District contended that the temporary 
total disability liability which was assessed entirely to 
the School District properly should have been apportioned 
in accordance with the relative contributions of the 
industrial injuries and the pre-existing condition. 
7. The full Industrial Commission granted the Motion 
of the School District and apportioned liability for 
temporary total disability benefits on the same basis as 
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permanent partial disability, i.e., 50% to the Second 
Injury Fund (pre-existing), 34% to plaintiff for the 1982 
and June 14, 1984 industrial injuries, and 16% to the 
School District for the last industrial injury of December 
5, 1984. The Industrial Commission denied the Motion of 
the plaintiff with respect to the Administrative Law 
Judge's apportionment of permanent partial disability 
compensation. It is that denial by the full Industrial 
Commission of plaintiff's Motion for Review and the 
granting of the School District's Motion for Review, which 
have given rise to the present action in the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the basic position of the Second Injury Fund in this 
case that plaintiff cannot avoid its rightful liability for 
permanent partial disability benefits under the Utah 
Workmens' Compensation Act and walk away scot-free by 
attempting to transfer that liability to the last 
industrial injury, i.e., the School District or by 
reversing it to the Second Injury Fund. The Duane Brown 
Chevrolet Company and Mountain States Steel Company cases 
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relied upon so heavily by plaintiff did not involve the Second 
Injury Fund as a party and in fact were decided before even thefirst 
Utah Supreme Court decision involving the Second Injury Fund was 
issued. It is common knowledge that an entirely new body of law has 
developed in Utah since 1980 (seven years after Duane Brown and five 
years after Mountain States Steel) in connection with the oft-
referred to "Combined Injury Fund" statutory provision. Section 
35-1-69, U.C.A., as amended. Indeed, that statute itself has been 
amended several times since the initial decisions by the Utah 
Supreme Court in such cases as Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. 
Capitano. Utah. 610 P.2d 334 (1980); Northwest Carriers Inc., v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah. Utah. 639 P.2d 138 (1981); and 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega. Utah. 562 P.2d 617 
(1977). In particular, the recent Supreme Court Opinion in Calvin 
David v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 649 P.2d 82 (1982) and the 
even more recent decision in Richfield Care Center v. Torgerson, 52 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Feb. 2, 1987), make it clear that the rationale 
of Duane Brown and Mountain States Steel no longer applies in the 
interpretation and application of the combined injury provisions of 
Section 35-1-69, U.C.A., just as the older Supreme Court decision in 
Sabo's Electronic Serv. v. Sabo, Utah, 642 P.2d 722 (1982), 
pertaining to the definition of "compensable accident" no longer 
applies in view of the principles laid down recently by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission. Utah, 729 P.2d 15 
(1986). 
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It is the Second Injury Fund's position that the two 
industrial injuries of August 18, 1982, and June 24, 1984, 
respectively, constitute viable compensable claims for which the 
applicant is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits from 
plaintiff who was the compensation carrier on those dates for the 
Jordan School District. It is clear also that applicant is entitled 
to permanent partial disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund 
for the 12.5% pre-existing permanent partial impairment under the 
application of Section 35-1-69. Finally, it is clear also that the 
School District is liable for the permanent impairment due to the 
last industrial injury of December 5, 1984. 
The parties have accepted the percentage of permanent 
partial impairment allocated to each of the three industrial 
injuries, as well as the permanent partial impairment attributable 
to conditions which pre-existed all of those industrial injuries. 
It is apparent that a separate Application very well could have been 
brought for each of the industrial injuries, in which case an award 
properly would have been in order against the plaintiff in the cases 
of the 1982 and the June 24, 1984, industrial injuries and against 
the School District for the December 5, 1984, injury. The 
consolidation of all of the injuries and the bringing in of the 
Second Injury Fund for the pre-existing impairment properly should 
have no effect upon the allocation of appropriate liability to each 
-10-
of the industrial injuries and to the Second Injury Fund, as was 
made by the Industrial Commission in this case. Therefore, the 
allocation of permanent partial disability made by the Industrial 
Commission should be affirmed. 
With respect to plaintiff's alternative arguments as to 
appropriate allocation of temporary total disability benefits, 
however, the Second Injury Fund believes that the recent Utah 
Supreme Court decision in Richfield Care Center v. Torqerson, Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23 (February 12, 1987), provides the appropriate basis for 
allocation among the various parties in this controversy. Under the 
Torqerson decision, each industrial injury must be evaluated 
separately for permanent partial disability allocation. Then the 
temporary total disability allocation following the last industrial 
injury of December 5, 1984, properly should be allocated between the 
School District to the extent of its percentage contribution, and 
the Second Injury Fund with respect to the remainder. For 
allocation of temporary total disability benefits after the December 
5, 1984 industrial injury all the prior industrial injuries become 
"pre-existing" within application of the reimbursement provisions of 
Section 35-1-69. Accordingly, under the rationale of Torgerson, the 
percentage of liability attributable to the last accident, i.e., 
4/25 or 16%, properly is the liability chargeable to the School 
District and the remainder 21/25 or 84%, is the liability of the 
-11-
Second Injury Fund. Therefore. defendant acknowledges that 
plaintiff, under this interpretation, having discharged its rightful 
liability for permanent partial disability benefits, has no further 
liability for temporary total disability compensation. 
V. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER 
OF LAW IN ORDERING APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY FOR 
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS AMONG THE 
SECOND INJURY FUND FOR PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENTS 
AND PLAINTIFF AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT. IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF 
EACH. AS FOUND BY THE MEDICAL PANEL WITH RESPECT 
TO PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY OF THE APPLICANT. 
The parties have accepted the medical panel's determination 
that applicant incurred industrial injuries on August 10, 1982. 
resulting in a 4.5% permanent partial impairment due to that 
industrial accident and on June 14, 1984, resulting in a permanent 
partial impairment of 4% due to that industrial accident. Both of 
these industrial injuries occurred while plaintiff was the workers' 
compensation carrier for the employer. It is also significant that. 
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at all times pertinent to this controversy, both of those industrial 
injuries were viable claims which could have been asserted 
separately by the applicant against plaintiff as workers1 
compensation carrier for the School District employer. In spite of 
the above, plaintiff asserts that because applicant had a third 
industrial injury subsequent to June, 1984, plaintiff no longer is 
responsible for any permanent partial disability benefits 
attributable to the acknowledged industrial injuries of 1982 and 
June 1984, respectively. In support of plaintiff's claim for 
complete immunity in this case, it refers to and relies upon - as 
mentioned above - two Supreme Court decisions in 1973 and 1975, 
respectively, in which the Industrial Commission's determination not 
to apportion permanent partial disability between insurance carriers 
was upheld. See Duane Brown Chevrolet Company v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, and Mountain States Steel Company v. Industrial 
Commission, supra. As pointed out above, the Second Injury Fund was 
not involved in either of those decisions which were rendered in 
accordance with established Utah Workers' Compensation law prior to 
the entirely new concept of combined injury liability which began 
with Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, Utah, 562 P.2d 617 
(1977) and Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d 
334 (1980) and has been followed with a veritable deluge of Supreme 
Court decisions between 1980 and 1987. Indeed, the provisions of 
35-1-69, U.C.A., pertaining to combined injuries, have been the 
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subject of more Utah Supreme Court decisions and interpretations 
with respect to apportionment of liability for permanent partial 
disability and permanent total disability, as well as reimbursement 
allocation for temporary total disability benefits and medical 
expenses than any single provision of the Utah Workers1 Compensation 
Act. Moreover, there have been amendments to the allocation 
provisions of 35-1-69, U.C.A., in an attempt to either stay abreast 
of, or counteract, the impact of various Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting that section. These amendments have been the subject 
of additional Supreme Court decisions which have resulted in further 
confusion and more litigation involving the so-called combined 
injury statute. 
Plaintiff has acknowledged that the Second Injury Fund was 
not involved in either the Duane Brown or the Mountain States Steel 
decisions, but argues that there has been no Supreme Court decision 
expressly overruling those cases. This may be true, but such cases 
as Calvin E. David v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 649 P.2d 
82 (1982) and the recent decision in Richfield Care Center v. 
Torqerson, 52 Utah, Adv. Rep. 23 (02/12/87) make it clear that the 
rationale of Duane Brown and Mountain States Steel no longer is 
applicable in the apportionment of liability between employers, 
carriers, and the Second Injury Fund under Section 35-1-69, U.C.A., 
as amended. 
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In the Calvin E. David case referred to above, the Utah 
Supreme Court in a unanimous decision, clearly recognized the method 
of allocation of permanent partial disability utilized by the 
Industrial Commission in this case. In that case, as here, there 
was an earlier injury (1977) and a later industrial injury (1978). 
There, also as here, both injuries constituted viable claims and the 
same medical report concerned both the earlier and later injuries. 
Finally, there, as here, the Commission fixed the two employers1 
liabilities simultaneously by a single Order with the applicant 
being awarded compensation for the 10% permanent partial disability 
from the earlier 1977 injury and also 10% permanent partial 
disability from the later 1978 industrial injury. The Supreme Court 
recognized without any question the correctness of that allocation 
and then dealt with the applicant's claim for additional permanent 
partial disability which he contended should have been forthcoming 
from the Second Injury Fund. The Supreme Court properly denied that 
additional claim because the payment by the Second Injury Fund in 
such a case would have constituted "double payment" to the applicant 
who already had been awarded payment by the Commission for the 
earlier 1977 injury. By inference however, the Court also made it 
clear that had there been a prior injury or "a previously incurred 
permanent incapacity for which no award can be made in the current 
proceeding", that such would have been compensable to the applicant 
from the Second Injury Fund under the statute as a "remainder" . . . 
."to be paid after the employer has discharged its liability. . . ." 
(649 P.2d at 84). 
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This same principle of separate allocation of disability 
compensation has been recognized by this Court in the very recent 
Richfield Care Center v. Torqerson case, supra. In that case, as in 
the Calvin David case, there was an earlier 1980 industrial injury 
and a later 1982 industrial injury, each of which was assigned a 
permanent partial physical impairment of 2.5% by the medical panel. 
In addition, the panel allocated a 2.5% permanent partial impairment 
to conditions which pre-existed both of the industrial injuries. 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that each industrial injury must 
be assessed separately and allocation of disability compensation 
made to the separate industrial injuries as between and among the 
employers and carriers of the respective industrial injuries and the 
Second Injury Fund for the pre-existing conditions. Thus, the case 
was remanded to the Industrial Commission to assess liability to the 
employers in each case and to the Second Injury Fund, with respect 
to the pre-existing contribution in the first instance to the 1980 
award and secondly with respect to the pre-existing contribution to 
the 1982 accident. 
Both of the above Utah Supreme Court decisions in essence 
reject the rationale of the Duane Brown and Mountain States Steel 
cases and require separate treatment of the accidents with 
apportionment of liability in each case. Thus, defendant Second 
Injury Fund submits that the Order of the Industrial Commission in 
this case should be affirmed with respect to its allocation of 
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permanent partial disability among the Second Injury Fund, plaintiff 
and the School District. 
POINT II 
IF THE COMMISSION'S ALLOCATION OF PERMANENT PARTIAL 
DISABILITY IS AFFIRMED, THEN THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCA-
TION OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
RESULTING FROM THE LAST INJURY OF DECEMBER 5, 1984, IS 
4/25 OR 16% FOUND BY THE PANEL TO BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
THE LAST ACCIDENT AND THE REMAINDER OF 21/25 OR 84% TO 
THE SECOND INJURY FUND. 
As indicated above, defendant Second Injury Fund strongly 
asserts that the allocation made by the Commission of permanent 
partial disability benefits, as set forth in Point I above, is 
proper under Utah Workers1 Compensation law. Once payment of 
permanent partial disability benefits in accordance with the 
Commission's allocation is made, then it is the opinion of defendant 
Second Injury Fund that plaintiff will have discharged its 
compensation obligation under the provisions of 35-1-69, U.C.A., as 
amended, and application of the rationale of the Supreme Court in 
the recent Richfield Care Center v. Torgerson case, supra, requires 
that the temporary total disability compensation liability be 
assessed against the School District to the extent of the 
contribution of the last industrial injury of December 5, 1984, 
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i.e., 4/25 or 16%. with the remainder now being assessed to the 
Second Injury Fund as "pre-existing" within the terms of 
reimbursement provisions of temporary total compensation under the 
statute. This requirement is made clear by the analysis set forth 
in Torgerson wherein the industrial accidents are considered 
separately in order to determine the percentage of impairment 
attributable to each accident and the proportion the pre-existing 
impairment bears to the total combined impairment. (52 Utah 80 Adv. 
Rep. at 24). Thus, the proper apportionment of temporary total 
disability compensation liability for the last injury of December 5. 
1984. is 4/25 or 16% to the employer and 21/25 or 84% to the Second 
Injury Fund. 
In view of the above, defendant Second Injury Fund will 
present no further argument with respect to the appropriate 
allocation to be made of temporary total compensation benefits 
resulting from the last injury of applicant while working for School 




Applicant sustained three separate compensable injuries 
during the period 1982 to 1984. The medical panel, in a single 
report, allocated permanent partial impairment to each of those 
injuries and the parties have accepted those allocations. It is 
also acknowledged that the Industrial Commission properly acquired 
jurisdiction over each of the compensable injuries and that each 
injury was a viable claim for compensation benefits at the time this 
consolidated case arose. Thus, it is clear that apart from the 
allocation of temporary total compensation and medical expenses, the 
employer or its carrier at the time of each of the three industrial 
injuries, rightfully is responsible for the permanent partial 
disability allocated to that particular injury by the medical panel, 
i.e., to the plaintiff 4.5% for the injury of August 10, 1982, and 
4% for the injury of June 14, 1984, with the School District being 
responsible for the 4% permanent partial impairment resulting from 
the last industrial injury of December 5, 1984. In addition, the 
medical panel allocated 12.5% permanent partial impairment to back 
problems which pre-existed all of the industrial injuries mentioned 
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above and the Second Injury Fund properly was assessed 
responsibility for the payment of permanent partial disability 
benefits for that 12.5% impairment. As the Supreme Court held in 
the 1982 Calvin David case, the applicant in a single proceeding is 
entitled to permanent partial disability benefits for the permanent 
impairment sustained in each of the individual industrial injuries 
and, in addition, for the permanent impairment which pre-existed all 
of those injuries. Under the statute, the Second Injury Fund 
properly is assessed for the pre-existing impairment. However, as 
the Court stated in the Calvin David decision, applicant is not 
entitled to double payment from the Second Injury Fund simply 
because the various industrial injuries occurred at different 
times. In short, the Court and the Industrial Commission treated 
each viable industrial injury separately in making its allocation of 
the permanent partial disability benefits to be made in the final 
assessment of liability. This separate treatment was also made by 
the Court in the recent Richfield Care Center v. Torqerson decision, 
which likewise assessed to the employer its appropriate liability 
for permanent partial disability benefits attributable to that 
particular injury. At the same time, the Court in Torqerson pointed 
out that there would be a difference in the reimbursement 
allocations because the contribution of "pre-existing" injuries and 
conditions would be greater for the last injury than it would for 
that injury which immediately preceded. It is the position of the 
defendant Second Injury Fund that the final result with respect to 
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permanent partial disability is that the Second Injury Fund will be 
assessed with liability for the permanent partial impairment which 
preceded all of the industrial injuries and that each industrial 
injury must bear the permanent partial disability found by the 
medical panel to be attributable to that particular injury. That is 
what the Industrial Commission held in this case, and that is what 
the Supreme Court in Calvin David determined to be the proper 
allocation of permanent partial disability. 
With respect to temporary total disability, as mentioned 
above, and as set forth in the Toraerson decision, the temporary 
total disability which followed the last industrial injury properly 
should be allocated to the employer at the time of the last injury 
for the contribution made by the last injury to the permanent 
partial impairment and to the Second Injury Fund for all of the 
remainder which is "pre-existing" as to the last industrial injury. 
In this case, the School District properly should be assessed 4/25 
or 16% of the temporary total disability compensation benefits and 
the Second Injury Fund with the "remainder" of 21/25 or 84%. 
The allocation set forth above not only follows the 
interpretations made by the Utah Supreme Court in the Calvin David 
and Toraerson cases involving the Combined Injury Fund provision 
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Section 35-1-69, U.C.A., as amended, it also is consistent with and 
carries out the oft-expressed intent of the Combined Injury 
statute. That intent, as set forth many times by the Utah Supreme 
Court, is to encourage the employment or the continued employment of 
employees with pre-existing handicaps or impairments by assessing to 
the employer only that liability attributable to the industrial 
injury which occurred during the particular employment with the 
"remainder" being assessed against the Second Injury Fund in 
accordance with the provisions of the Combined Injury Fund statute. 
The Second Injury Fund submits that the allocation of permanent 
partial disability made by the Industrial Commission properly 
assesses the liability for each industrial injury where it belongs 
as among the Second Injury Fund, plaintiff, and the School District 
and that the treatment set forth hereinabove by defendant Second 
Injury Fund with respect to allocation of the temporary total 
disability compensation benefits is consistent with the 
reimbursement provisions of the statute as well as with the 
expressed intent of the Combined Injury Fund statutory enactment. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of April 1987. 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator Ralph Finlayson 
Second Injury Fund Assistant Attorney General of Utah 
Attorney for Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
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